In attempting to distract from the vaccuous nature of his anti-IP theory, Stephan Kinsella offers “The Non-Aggression Principle as a Limit on Action, Not Property Rights”. This alleged distinction is the reddest of red herrings, and amounts to nothing more than semantics.
The cornerstone of Kinsella’s thesis is that IP is invalid because enforcing IP necessarily imposes restrictions on the use of physical property by others.
This is glaring problem for Kinsella. How can IP be invalid because it imposes restrictions on the use of the physical property of others, while physical property imposes the exact same kinds of restrictions?
Thus, Kinsella equivocates the “action” / “property” dichotomy. According to Kinsella, a valid property claim places restrictions on the action of another, but does not impose restrictions on the property rights of another. This is just silly. Obviously Kinsella wishes to attach one term (“property rights”) to IP (so that it may be discredited), and a different term (“action”) to PP (so that it is favored).
As Hans-Hermann Hoppe explains, all human action involves the use of the actor’s property. This flows directly from the right to self-ownership. I may act, only because I have a property right in my own human body. If we adopted universal communism, under which every person owns an equal share of every other person, then no person could act without the permission of everyone else. Since asking permission is itself an act, no human action would be possible at all.
There is no such thing as human action that does not involve the use of the actor’s property. If I impose a restriction on your action, then I also impose a restriction on the use of your property. Period.
Adopting Kinsella’s semantics, we see that, as always, IP is no different than PP.
When you copy my song, you are acting. My copyright disallows you the ACTION of copying. OK? You still own your pen and paper. You still own your computer. Copyright represents no physical invasion of any sort. Copyright simply places a limitation on your actions, which, according to Kinsella, is allowable under the law.
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The cornerstone of Kinsella’s thesis is that IP is invalid because enforcing IP necessarily imposes restrictions on the use of physical property by others.
“This is my pen, my ink, and my paper. Who are you to tell me I may not write down a copy of your book?”As I and several others have pointed out, all property imposes restrictions on the use of other property by other people, by definition. A key element of any valid property claim is the right to exclude other people from using the thing that is owned. You own your car, but you may not drive on my land. I own my hammer, but I may not smash your windshield.
This is glaring problem for Kinsella. How can IP be invalid because it imposes restrictions on the use of the physical property of others, while physical property imposes the exact same kinds of restrictions?
Thus, Kinsella equivocates the “action” / “property” dichotomy. According to Kinsella, a valid property claim places restrictions on the action of another, but does not impose restrictions on the property rights of another. This is just silly. Obviously Kinsella wishes to attach one term (“property rights”) to IP (so that it may be discredited), and a different term (“action”) to PP (so that it is favored).
As Hans-Hermann Hoppe explains, all human action involves the use of the actor’s property. This flows directly from the right to self-ownership. I may act, only because I have a property right in my own human body. If we adopted universal communism, under which every person owns an equal share of every other person, then no person could act without the permission of everyone else. Since asking permission is itself an act, no human action would be possible at all.
There is no such thing as human action that does not involve the use of the actor’s property. If I impose a restriction on your action, then I also impose a restriction on the use of your property. Period.
Adopting Kinsella’s semantics, we see that, as always, IP is no different than PP.
When you copy my song, you are acting. My copyright disallows you the ACTION of copying. OK? You still own your pen and paper. You still own your computer. Copyright represents no physical invasion of any sort. Copyright simply places a limitation on your actions, which, according to Kinsella, is allowable under the law.
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Hint: your insertion of the word “use” is the problem with your re-statement.
As for your reliance on Hoppe–this is ironic. Given this:
“Daily Bell: Where do you stand on copyright? Do you believe that intellectual property doesn’t exist as Kinsella has proposed?
Dr. Hans-Hermann Hoppe: I agree with my friend Kinsella, that the idea of intellectual property rights is not just wrong and confused but dangerous. And I have already touched upon why this is so. Ideas – recipes, formulas, statements, arguments, algorithms, theorems, melodies, patterns, rhythms, images, etc. – are certainly goods (insofar as they are good, not bad, recipes, etc.), but they are not scarce goods. Once thought and expressed, they are free, inexhaustible goods. I whistle a melody or write down a poem, you hear the melody or read the poem and reproduce or copy it. In doing so you have not taken anything away from me. I can whistle and write as before. In fact, the entire world can copy me and yet nothing is taken from me. (If I didn’t want anyone to copy my ideas I only have to keep them to myself and never express them.)
Now imagine I had been granted a property right in my melody or poem such that I could prohibit you from copying it or demanding a royalty from you if you do. First: Doesn’t that imply, absurdly, that I, in turn, must pay royalties to the person (or his heirs) who invented whistling and writing, and further on to those, who invented sound-making and language, and so on? Second: In preventing you from or making you pay for whistling my melody or reciting my poem, I am actually made a (partial) owner of you: of your physical body, your vocal chords, your paper, your pencil, etc. because you did not use anything but your own property when you copied me. If you can no longer copy me, then, this means that I, the intellectual property owner, have expropriated you and your “real” property. Which shows: intellectual property rights and real property rights are incompatible, and the promotion of intellectual property must be seen as a most dangerous attack on the idea of “real” property (in scarce goods).
Daily Bell: We have suggested that if people want to enforce generational copyright that they do so on their own, taking on the expense and attempting through various means to confront copyright violators with their own resources. This would put the onus of enforcement on the pocket book of the individual. Is this a viable solution – to let the market itself decide these issues?
Dr. Hans-Hermann Hoppe: That would go a long way in the right direction. Better still: more and more courts in more and more countries, especially countries outside the orbit of the US dominated Western government cartel, would make it clear that they don’t hear cases of copyright and patent violations any longer and regard such complaints as a ruse of big Western government-connected firms, such as pharmaceutical companies, for instance, to enrich themselves at the expense of other people.
”
Hoppe Interview on Anarchy and Intellectual Property: http://c4sif.org/2011/03/hoppe-interview-on-anarchy-and-intellectual-property/
See also Hoppe on Intellectual Property c4sif.org/2010/12/hoppe-on-intellectual-property/
But property rights of others *do* place restrictions on my *use* of my property–but that is not al imitation on my property rights. As i pointed out, others’ property rights place limits on what I can *do*–using *whatever* means I have at my disposal, whether it’s just my body, or some other scarce means, whether i own the means or not. The limitation has nothing to do with my property rights. If you own your body I have no right to punch it with my first, to stab it with my knife, or with a stolen knife. The limitation is on my action and this does *not* mean that my ownership of a knife is “limited” by your property rights.
You guys want to point to things we are not permitted to do–because of property rights (!)–as a reason to restrict property rights. Thus, when I point out that your IP ideas would restrict my property rights, you say “well what’s the big deal, all property rights are limited.” but htey are not. It is actions that are limited.
You instead should argue “well property rights always restrict actions others can perform.” And then you would argue: “so therefore if IP in a song means you can’t perform certain actions, how can you object?” The reply is this: first, just b/c property rights limit some actions you can perform, does not mean that *any* restrictions on action are unobjectionalble. Second, this would make it clear you are question-begging, since you are trying to show that there are property rights in patterns of information, by showing that it’s okay to restrict people’s actions with respect to other, noncontroversial forms of property rights. So you are just question begging. You have to assume property rights in ideas are legitimate to say that it’s legitimate ot restrict people’s actions. You can’t reverse it, which is what you are trying to do, which is just a muddy form of equivocation and question-begging.
“You have to assume property rights in ideas are legitimate to say that it’s legitimate ot restrict people’s actions. ”
Just as . . .
You have to assume property rights in physical things are legitimate to say that it’s legitimate ot restrict people’s actions.
As always, IP and PP operate identically.
“You have to assume property rights in ideas are legitimate to say that it’s legitimate ot restrict people’s actions. ”
Just as . . .
You have to assume property rights in physical things are legitimate to say that it’s legitimate ot restrict people’s actions.”
Yes, Baker, but presumably, we *do not disagree on this*. So why do you bring it up? The subject under contention is whether there ought to be property rights in other things. We arleady agree in rights in physical things–or are you going to back off on this too, now?
“As always, IP and PP operate identically.”
Well, slavery laws operate “identically” too. I mean if you own a human, such as a Jew, you can make jew lampshades from them. It’s your right. Amiright? So… it’s kind of irrelevant to the humanitarian and the liberal whether they “operate identically.”
My approach is to apply one consistent standard in analyzing the legitimacy of property, whether physical or intangible.
Your approach is to apply two different standards – one for analyzing physical property, and the other for analyzing intangible property.
If you wish to show that IP is invalid, shouldn’t you apply exactly the same standard which already shows physical property to be valid?
That’s why I “bring it up”.
But your standard is not consistent. You object to people copying songs, but you do not object to people copying bicycles.
Copying my song is trespass in intellectual space, copying a bike is not.
You give the conclusion but no argument. Why is copying a bicycle not trespass, if copying a song is trespass and IP and PP are identical?
So again homesteading is the issue. Does that make your standard consistent? Why can you homestead teh song, but no one can homestead the bike? Or maybe some bikes can be homesteaded but others can’t?
You are the one who claims that IP and PP operate differently. You claim that IP interferes with valid property rights of others, while PP merely restricts the actions of others.
As I’ve shown, IP and PP operate the same. You appear to be close to acknowledging as much.