Here are comments from Roger Browne (quoted) with my comments (interspersed).
Alternatively, the writer could conceal the song from the singer. But, um, why would a singer buy a song she never heard?
. . .to prevent a burglar entering my property, and I will use non-violent force . . .
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1. A singer would indeed be unlikely to buy a song she has never heard, from a songwriter she has never heard of. That’s not the situation I was intending to describe. I’m thinking of an established songwriter who is writing a new work.Do you imagine that some babies are born as established songwriters? Without exception, every “established” songwriter began as an unknown songwriter.
Perhaps a singer commissioned the work to be written, on the basis of the writer’s reputation and previous work.What previous work? See, like all socialists, you simply assume the existence of wealth, and offer verbiage to rationalize expropriating it. Without copyright, writers don’t bother writing, just like farmers don’t bother growing crops when they know the produce will be taken away. Sure, amateurs will write for fun and self-expression, just like people plant gardens for self-expression. But nobody is going to become a commercial farmer without a property right in the produce.
Or perhaps the songwriter is producing the work “on spec” and will market it to people who wish to record it, at a price sufficient to cover the time and effort required to create the work. (Incidentally, many of us here were founding members of liberty.me, and did pay money in advance for a website we’d never seen. So it can sometimes work that way.)Marketing a song to a singer on spec is done all the time. The writer writes the song, and produces a recording called a “demo”. The writer then sends the song to the singer in hopes the singer will like it. Without copyright, the singer simply records the song, and the writer is screwed.
Alternatively, the writer could conceal the song from the singer. But, um, why would a singer buy a song she never heard?
2. No, not all business owners ensure their income stream through government-backed violence. For example, I don’t.Liar. Of course you do.
I work hard to ensure that my customers are satisfied.If you have customers, you must sell something. Whatever you sell must be your property, otherwise you have no right to sell it. Property rights include the right to use violence to enforce, by definition. This is not my theory, this is standard libertarian property theory. If you disagree, go argue with Rothbard, Mises, Hoppe, Kinsella, et al.
If they use my service and won’t pay, I do not invoke the violence of the court system. Instead, I put my energy into making the other 99.5% of my customers even more satisfied, and refuse to do further business with the occasional dickead.Will you please give me your physical address, and a written waiver stating that you will not prosecute me for any property violations I commit against you? Didn’t think so. It’s fatiguing exposing such lies, but I must.
If my ISP provides crappy service, I don’t invoke the violence of the court system; I just find a better ISP. (I presume the liberty.me business model doesn’t enforce its income stream through government-backed violence either.)Of course liberty.me enforces its income stream through government-backed violence. Good grief. What do you suppose Jeffrey Tucker would do if someone hacked his WordPress, and deleted the entire community? Suppose Tucker could prove who did it, and the person refused to compensate. What then Roger Browne?
3. No, I do not personally, today, in the real world, rely on threat of violence to defend my property.Yes, you do. Unless you give me your address and that written waiver.
I will use force, yes, but not violence.LMFAO. Classic. My cheeks hurt from laughing so hard.
I will use non-violent force. . .Non-violent force? Stop it, you’re killing me.
. . .to prevent a burglar entering my property, and I will use non-violent force . . .
Like, vegetarian meat? Like a square circle?Yea! You finally found the word “initiate”!! Congratulations. Yes, I too will never initiate force to defend my property. My force, if any, will be purely defensive.
. . .to retrieve my property from a burglar, but I will never initiate violent force over mere property.
Nor will I use any type of force to stop a burglar from making a copy of my property.“Copying” is not necessarily right or wrong, just like “walking” is neither right nor wrong. If you walk on my property, you trespass. If you walk on your own land, you’re cool. If you copy my song, you’re trespassing, for the reasons rigorously explained throughout Intellectual Space. If you copy something else, perhaps it is not trespassing. It depends on the property rights involved, not the act of “copying” per se.
4. It’s a fact that preventing people from making copies can only be achieved by violence or the threat of violence.Of course, as with any property rights enforcement. As always, IP is no different than PP.
It’s a fact that preventing people from taking originals can be achieved in many ways, both violent and non-violent. There’s no pretence [sic], dishonesty or scare-mongering involved, so your supposition is false.Your pretense is pretending that IP enforcement requires force, while physical property enforcement does not. That’s false. You know it’s false. Other than the mere fact that physical things are physical, and intangible things are intangible, there is no difference at all.
5. I have never, in my adult life, been intentionally dishonest.Well, who wrote all those lies above?
6. I have no intention to deprive others of their rightful property.You intend to deprive me and millions of others of our rightful property. I will give up my song when you pry my cold, dead fingers from around it.
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No. That’s why I specifically stated that my paragraph referred to “an established songwriter who is writing a new work”.
You wrote: “Without copyright, writers don’t bother writing”.
You may find the following research paper enlightening: “Emergence of Musical Copyright in Europe from 1709 to 1850″ by F M Scherer of Harvard University. It shows how Verdi, enriched by copyright protection, reduced his creative output, and that a golden age of musical composition simultaneously occurred in countries that lacked copyright protection.
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=315
You called me “Liar” when I mentioned that I do not ensure my income stream through government-backed violence.
Firstly, this is discourteous. Secondly, it’s untrue. I provide research services to my customers. If they don’t like my research, they don’t need to pay. If they DO like my work, and take the work and run without paying, I still will not invoke government-backed violence. Of course I refuse to do further work for them in the future. I may lose a few hundred dollars, but it happens less than half a percent of the time, and I build up a group of great customers who are satisfying to work with.
You wrote: “Will you please give me your physical address, and a written waiver stating that you will not prosecute me for any property violations I commit against you?”
I will not ask the government to prosecute ANYONE (even you) for property violations, for ANY address at which I might be staying. I will, however, use force to try to prevent you from taking my property. For example, I keep my valuables locked away securely, inside a well-protected house. If you try to take my stuff, I will try to stop you (for example by attempting to disable your getaway vehicle). I will try to retrieve my stuff after you have taken it. And I will make sure that you become a “persona non grata” in my community (you will lose your reputation, and will probably lose your job or your customers). But I will not invoke government violence, nor will I use violent force against you. By “violent force”, I mean force that requires violence against your person.
You wrote: “Your pretense is pretending that IP enforcement requires force, while physical property enforcement does not”.
I referred to violence, which is a subset of force. One can protect physical property by keeping it in a secure vault (non-violent force). But how can one protect “IP” without violence or the threat thereof?
You wrote: “I will give up my song when you pry my cold, dead fingers from around it.”
Believe it or not, those who don’t believe in IP do not want to pry anything from your fingers. They are happy with a copy which your fingers have never touched. More likely than not, they would like to get a creator-endorsed copy from you, but if you cripple your copy with DRM or threaten violence it only makes the third-party copy more appealing.
Finally, if you wish to continue this conversation, please stop the rudeness. I know you find it hard to come to terms with some of the things that I am saying, but I am not lying.
Your distinction between “force” and “violence’ is a red herring. OK, force is a subset of violence. When an armed robber comes your store, and threatens your physical property (including but not limited to the physical property of your human body), what are you going to do? Libertarian theory holds that the use of defensive force, up to and including deadly force, is allowed.
Thus, your assertion that one does not need “violence” or the “threat of violence” to protect physical property is just false. This holds whether in a statist or stateless society. If we lived in a world with no threat of retaliatory violence, criminals of all sorts would obviously run rampant.
Obviously your (Kinsella’s) theory of Intellectual Communism cannot withstand this scrutiny, because it is founded upon the assertion that intangible property is somehow fundamentally different than physical property. It isn’t. The two differ in precisely one respect – physical property is physical, intangible property is intangible.
I do congratulate you for adding another item to “The Alleged Case Against Intellectual Property”.
8. Intellectual Property Requires Violence to Enforce.
Rule 8: If X requires violence or the treat of violence to protect, then X cannot be rightful property.
X = a convenience store.
A convenience store requires the threat of violence to protect. Therefore a convenience store cannot be property? Rule 8 Fails.
Your assertion that my “fingers have never touched” the copy of my song on your hard drive is just false. My fingers built that song, and built every single copy of that song in existence. Evidently, when you deny that my fingers touched that copy, you mean “physically touched”. If that’s what you mean, that’s just assuming your conclusion.
Yes, if rivalry must be physical, then property must be physical, by definition. If that is your definition, that’s all you need to say. Everything else is a complete waste of times. Here is Kinsella’s entire thesis:
1. Property must be rivalrous (see Hoppe et.al)
2. Rivalry must be physical (assumed)
3. Therefore, property must be physical.
That’s it. There is no need to say anything more. Of course, when we allow such conclusion smuggling, we can “prove” anything.
If you write down a standard by which the legitimacy of a property claim can be evaluated, one of two things will become apparent. Either:
1. Your standard will include “physical” . . .
or
2. Your standard will operate identically for both species of property.
I am asking you (or Kinsella, or any Intellectual Communist) to formulate a standard by which one can evaluate the legitimacy of a property claim.
My current opinion is that Intellectual Communists refuse to formulate such a standard in plain English, for the reasons stated above. You are employing a dishonest double standard. (Your theory is dishonest, repugnantly so, while you are a fine upstanding gentleman). If I am wrong, then write down the standard.
You’ve admitted that multiple people can be in possession of a song simultaneously, even though there is only one song. That is not the case with physical things: multiple people cannot be in possession of the exact same physical thing simultaneously. This is the standard.
There is no assumption that property must be physical; there is a recognition that the entire reason property rights are necessary is because there are things that only one person can control at a time and that therefore rules determining exclusive ownership must be established. When multiple people can control the same thing simultaneously, the need for property rights doesn’t arise.
What you mean to say is that exclusive control is possible for physical things, and not possible for intangible things, right?
And what I am saying is this:
The boundary around what is a “thing” is arbitrary. The universe is a “thing”. An atom is a “thing”. A car is a “thing”. The brakes on the car are a “thing”.
You then arbitrarily define the physical “thing” in such a way that only one person can “use” it, then arbitrarily define an intangible “thing” in a completely different way, so that it appears that many people can “use” it at once. It’s intellectually dishonest (the theory, not you).
We can just as easily define “things” so that the opposite result occurs. I’ve gone through this in excruciating detail in “Songs are Like Factories (a deeper look).
Any physical thing, down to sub-atomic particles, can only be used by one person at a time. Define the boundaries however you’d like. I’m not relying on any special definitions.
Any intangible thing can theoretically be used by everyone simultaneously. Define the boundaries however you’d like. The reason I say “theoretically” is because the use of intangible things is limited only by physical reality.
It is impossible to use an intangible thing without using a physical thing.
That’s ridiculous. A thousand people can use the empire state building at the same time. The empire state building is a thing.
“I’m not relying on any special definitions”.
Of course you are. You won’t let me say the empire state building is a thing.
“Any intangible thing can theoretically be used by everyone simultaneously.”
The Earth is a physical thing. We are all using it simultaneously.
“It is impossible to use an intangible thing without using a physical thing.”
So what? It’s impossible to use a physical thing without using some other physical thing. If your statement is an argument against IP, why isn’t it an argument against PP?
You keep offering arguments FOR physical property, and AGAINST IP. Everything you say favoring physical property applies equally to IP. Everything you say against IP applies equally to PP.
If you disagree, then take my challenge. Write down a standard by which we can determine the validity of a property claim. Go for it. I double dare you.
It matters that it’s impossible to use an intangible thing without a physical thing because we already agree that there should be property rights in physical things. So, by advocating additional property rights in intangible things, you are creating a conflict. You are advocating that multiple people have simultaneous claims to the same physical things.
The standard is: can multiple people possess the exact same thing simultaneously? If no, property rights are necessary. If yes, no property rights are necessary.
“It is impossible to use an intangible thing without using a physical thing.”
It’s impossible to use a physical thing without using some other physical thing.
If your statement is an argument against IP, why isn’t it an argument against PP?
Yes, IP “rights” exist in a long tradition of state censorship and control.
Sure, it’s impossible to use a physical thing without using some other physical thing. Well, property rights are necessary in those things, as we already agree. So there’s no conflict. There is a conflict when you advocate that multiple people have simultaneous claims to the same physical things.
Sure, people can voluntarily agree to co-own various things (houses, businesses, etc.). But that doesn’t change the nature of such things as far as the fact that they can only be controlled ultimately by one person. What you are advocating is involuntary “co-ownership,” or an actual form of communism.
Legitimizing property rights will ultimately turn on the meaning of several key terms, among them “rivalrous”, “use”, and “possession”. If “rivalrous” means “physically rivalrous”, then I agree, property must be physical. If ‘use” means “physically use”, then I agree, property must be physical. If “possession” means “physical possession”, then I agree, property must be physical.
However, as I’ve pointed out repeatedly, with those definitions, proving the illegitimacy of IP requires only 3 short steps:
Premise 1: Property must be rivalrous (see Hoppe, et. al.)
Premise 2: Rivalry must be physical (assumed, by definition).
Conclusion: Therefore property must be physical (QED).
That’s it. You do not need to say anything else. Just claim your definitions are “standard” definitions, and keep repeating them. Everything else is complete distraction.
By the way, the “standard” definition of property includes intellectual property. Where does that leave us?
If X requires a physical container to be useful, then X cannot be property?
When you say that you “control your songs,” what you really mean is that you control other people’s physical things. You tell them, “you can’t use your computer to do X,” or “you can’t use your body to do X,” or “you can’t use your guitar to do X,” or “you can’t make money by using your property to do X,” or whatever.
If one must employ physical means to affect control over X, then X cannot be property?
Tell me, how can you “control your songs” without controlling other people’s physical things?
But first, you are so sure of yourself, you must have a rule in your mind that allows you to decide that a factory is valid property, but a song is not. I need a statement of that rule.
Are you willing and able to write down that rule that is in your head? Yes or no?
Controlling songs requires restriction the actions of others (don’t copy) just as controlling a car requires restricting the actions of others (don’t drive my car).
Could you please get to the part where PP and IP are different in any way?
If someone drives my car, I can’t drive my car. If I could drive my car while someone else was driving my car, then I wouldn’t need to worry about having the legal right to control it. Well, someone else can play your song at the same time you play your song, so you don’t need to worry about having the legal right to control it.
Do you see the difference?
A “car” is a manufactured good that is made in a factory. Prior to the existence of the factory, it is extremely expensive to make cars. Now, it is cheap. With the factory running, the factory owner makes many cars. You drive your car, I drive my car, and other people drive their cars.
A “song-copy” is a manufactured good that is made in a song-master. Prior to the existence of the song-master, it is extremely expensive to make song-copies. Now, it is cheap. With the song-master running, the song-master owner makes many song-copies. You listen to your song-copy, I listen to my song-copy, and other people listen to their song-copies.
Same. Freaking. Thing.
Honestly Stephen, I already conceded victory to you (assuming your definitions). In fact, you have achieved what Kinsella did not. You made it from your premise to your conclusion in one step, not 3:
“Intangible things don’t exist apart from their physical manifestations” – Stephen Davis
This view is called “Strict Materialism”. Look it up. Although many classical scientists felt that materialism must be correct, I can assure you that quantum mechanics destroyed it completely.
Yes, if you assume that intangible things don’t exist, then there is no property right in them. That’s all you need to say. As for me, I agree with Ludwig von Mises about how to tell if something is real:
https://homesteadip.liberty.me/2014/05/26/the-mises-test-of-external-reality/
However, the discussion we are having is about property rights. It is a simple fact that you can’t drive my car while I drive my car. But I can play your song while you play your song. Do you seriously deny this?
You can’t drive my car while I drive my car, but I can play your song while you play your song. I can make your recipe while you make your recipe. I can use your formula while you use your formula. So can everyone else. No property rights necessary.
I say that a song-master is like a car-factory, because both are used to mass-produce identical copies for sale on the market. I say that the song-copy is like a car-copy, because both are mass-produced, and both can only be used by 1 or a small number of people.
You want to completely ignore the factory analogy, but why (other than it destroys Kinsella’s “argument”)? You can’t just assume the existence of cars. Cars are copied, just like songs are copied. Stop ignoring the obvious.
Hint: Answering a “why” question requires a “because” answer.
First, rivalrousness is a characteristic of a good. Whether something is rivalrous has nothing whatsoever to do with anyone’s intended use. A good is either rivalrous or it isn’t, based on its nature. If a good can be used by any number of people simultaneously, then it is not rivalrous.
Second, someone else making copies of an intangible good using their own physical property is in no way reducing your productive capacity. Productive capacity is the maximum amount of goods that can be produced in a given period using given resources. In the case of someone else making copies of an intangible good using their own physical property, both your intangible good and your physical property are unchanged, so your resources are exactly the same.
Third, your use of the term “interfere” is bizarre. If you have a thing and can do whatever you want with it at the exact same time that someone else has the same thing and can do whatever they want with it, there is no possible way that you could interfere with each other in any normal sense of the term. What you are saying amounts to: “It is true that we both can do whatever we want with the thing simultaneously, but I don’t want someone else to do particular things with the thing. Therefore, because they are going against my wishes, they are interfering with me.” This is a highly problematic conception of “interference” for obvious reasons.
So why would someone simply acting against your wishes be violating your property rights? After all, you still have the thing and can do whatever you want with it at the exact same time that the other person can do the same. This is where you make clear what your entire theory boils down to: you say that you “built” the thing, so you own “100% of all possible use.”
As has already been pointed out, creation is not an independent source of property rights. If I create a beautiful statue out of marble that belongs to someone else, I don’t own the statue. So why do you keep insisting that you have some sort of property right just because you “built” something?
The fact is, if any number of people can do whatever they want with the same thing simultaneously, no conflict is possible over that thing. Someone else doing something you disapprove of does not constitute a conflict. By insisting that you have a veto right over other people’s bodies and physical things in cases where their actions in no way conflict with yours, you are creating conflict where there is none.
At the end of the day, your theory is a contrived way of saying that you should have control over the way other people use their bodies and physical things because you deserve to have control over the intangible goods you create. That’s it.
http://homesteadip.liberty.me/2014/08/29/29/?refer=libertyme
It still simply boils down your definition of “rivalrous”. You mean “physically rivalrous”. With that definition is play, I’ve already said you are right. But, again, I’m not willing to accept that definition as a premise, any more than you would accept IP as a premise.
No, you are wrong about the word substitution. The word “physical” appears 5 times in my post above, and at no point do I rely on it for any definitions. I don’t mean “physically rivalrous.” I mean rivalrous, as in the standard economics definition. A good that can be used by any number of people simultaneously is not rivalrous.
Please, respond to my actual points. Specifically:
- If you have a thing and can do whatever you want with it at the exact same time that someone else has the same thing and can do whatever they want with it, in what possible way could you interfere with each other?
- Do you think creation is an independent source of property rights?
- Do you think that, if any number of people can do whatever they want with a thing simultaneously, that someone else doing something you disapprove of constitutes a conflict?
When you copy my song, I am NOT able to do with my “thing” what I WANT to do with my “thing”. Just because Machine #97 is off does not mean I am not using it. It simply means that I prefer that it is off right now. Having Machine #97 off IS MY USE. It is not possible for Machine #97 to be on and off at the same time. Therefore your turning it on interferes with my use.
“Do you think creation is an independent source of property rights?”
There is no such thing as “creation”. The sum total of matter and energy in the Universe is fixed.
“Do you think that, if any number of people can do whatever they want with a thing simultaneously, that someone else doing something you disapprove of constitutes a conflict?”
If you’re using my thing, it’s a conflict. If you’re using your own thing, it’s not a conflict. When you copy my song, you are using my thing. You are using my Machine #97 in my factory.
Even though Machine #97 was off, and even though I am still able to make the same number of copies myself, you are using my machine. I prefer that Machine #97 remain off. Since I built Machine #97 myself, with my own labor and my own raw materials, I own Machine #97. Simply because you learned the location of Machine #97, and are ABLE to operate it, despite my efforts to stop you, does not mean you are legally allowed to do so. Machine #97 is mine. Stop using it, or I will sue you for trespass.
I’m glad that you recognize this. You keep using the word “built” though, as though that’s an independent source of property rights, which it’s not.
“When you copy my song, I am NOT able to do with my ‘thing’ what I WANT to do with my ‘thing’. Just because Machine #97 is off does not mean I am not using it. It simply means that I prefer that it is off right now. Having Machine #97 off IS MY USE. It is not possible for Machine #97 to be on and off at the same time. Therefore your turning it on interferes with my use.”
You are freely admitting exactly what my criticism of your position is. You are saying: “It is true that we both can do whatever we want with the thing simultaneously, but I don’t want someone else to do particular things with the thing. Therefore, because they are going against my wishes, they are interfering with me.”
You ARE able to do what you want with your thing; you just don’t WANT someone else to do a particular thing with their thing, which you are simply asserting is yours. Your machine #97 can be on or off. Their machine #97 can be on or off. Each can be INDEPENDENTLY CONTROLLED, unlike the machine you are trying to analogize to. It is true that a machine can’t be both on and off at the same time, but in the case of a thing that, by its nature, allows any number of people to do whatever they want with it simultaneously, its use is not restricted to being on or off. This is the fact that you can’t bring yourself to admit.
“If you’re using my thing, it’s a conflict. If you’re using your own thing, it’s not a conflict. When you copy my song, you are using my thing. You are using my Machine #97 in my factory.”
Again, you are freely admitting exactly what my criticism of your position is. You think that you deserve to have control over the intangible goods you create, period. You just assert that it’s your thing, and skip over the reality that any number of people can do whatever they want with the thing simultaneously.
“Transformation into usefulness” is an essential element of homesteading, Kinsella notwithstanding. Beginning with John Locke’s “mix the labor with the land”, libertarians including Rothbard and Hoppe acknowledge the importance of transformation into usefulness.
If mere discovery and embordering were sufficient to legitimize property, then Columbus could claim the entire Western Hemisphere. Kinsella is completely by himself with his foolish notion of homesteading, but his theory requires it.
So, yes, “build” is a source of property rights, when “build” is understood to mean “transform previously un-owned resources into usefulness”.
Re: The Machine Analogy.
You have ignored my challenge and question 5 separate times. I will ask once again. If you do not answer this time, your future comments will be deleted.
@Stephen Davis:
Focus purely on PHYSICAL PROPERTY. I built a PHYSICAL factory with 100 PHYSICAL machines. I make PHYSICAL widgets with my PHYSICAL machines. For whatever reason, I decide that, right now, I will turn PHYSICAL Machine #1 on, and make widgets. PHYSICAL Machines #2-100 are off.
You PHYSICALLY enter my PHYSICAL building, and begin PHYSICALLY operating PHYSICAL Machine #97 to make PHYSICAL widgets.
Your operating PHYSICAL Machine #97 does not in any way interfere with my ability to operate PHYSICAL Machine #1. In this example, up to 99 people could use the PHYSICAL Machines, without interfering. Obviously, I could have made 1000 PHYSICAL Machines. Or 1,000,000 Machines. Or 5,234,724,856,122,638,354 Machines.
Any number of people can use the PHYSICAL Machines, and it does not interfere with my using MACHINE #1.
Mr. Davis, sir. Please completely ignore the issue of IP. Please discuss the PHYSICAL property rights issues in this hypothetical.
Does your use of PHYSICAL Machine #97 interfere with my property rights? Why or why not?
Thank you.
You PHYSICALLY enter my PHYSICAL building, and begin PHYSICALLY operating PHYSICAL Machine #97 to make PHYSICAL widgets.
Your operating PHYSICAL Machine #97 does not in any way interfere with my ability to operate PHYSICAL Machine #1. In this example, up to 99 people could use the PHYSICAL Machines, without interfering. Obviously, I could have made 1000 PHYSICAL Machines. Or 1,000,000 Machines. Or 5,234,724,856,122,638,354 Machines.
Any number of people can use the PHYSICAL Machines, and it does not interfere with my using MACHINE #1.
Mr. Davis, sir. Please completely ignore the issue of IP. Please discuss the PHYSICAL property rights issues in this hypothetical.
Does your use of PHYSICAL Machine #97 interfere with my property rights? Why or why not?”
You own all 100 machines because you homesteaded them or contracted for them. Each machine can be on or off; no machine can be both on and off simultaneously. If you turn machine 1 on and leave machines 2-100 off, someone turning on any of machines 2-100 is interfering with your use of those machines. Someone turning on machine 97 isn’t interfering with your use of machine 1; they are interfering with your use of machine 97. Thus, they are violating your property rights.
Perfect! I agree. Next:
You wish to construe each Machine as 1 “thing”, and that’s fine. But note that we could just as easily construe the entire factory as 1 “thing”.
Depending on the total number of PHYSICAL Machines, the factory has some theoretical upper-limit on production. If all Machines were running, some total quantity of PHYSICAL widgets could be produced per day. As factory owner, I decide how many machines to operate.
Even if I am only producing 1% of the quantity of widgets that I theoretically COULD produce, because I am only running 1% of my PHYSICAL Machines, I still have a right to deny you use of Machine #97, simply because I own it.
The total number of Machines is irrelevant. This principle would hold true if there were 3 Machines. Or 1 billion Machines. The easy way to express this is as a percentage. I own 100% of the produce of my factory, REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY MACHINES EXIST, and REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY MACHINES ARE RUNNING.
If 37 PHYSICAL widgets are produced on my PHYSICAL Machines, I own them all. If 6,325,943,123,788 PHYSICAL widgets are produced, I own them all. It doesn’t matter how many I COULD have made by running more or fewer PHYSICAL Machines. If some trespasser uses Machine #97, those widgets are mine also.
Mr. Davis, I believe we are in complete agreement about this PHYSICAL property hypothetical.
Now let me ask you about intangible goods.
My song-master is an INTANGIBLE factory with INTANGIBLE Machines inside. What makes you think you have any right to operate machine #97?
If you want to construe my “song-master” as 1 “thing”, that is like saying the “factory” is one “thing”. Fine. In that case, you must look to the TOTAL PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY of the entire “song-master”. Your copying reduces my percentage of use below 100%, the same way that using Machine #97 reduces my percentage of use for the entire factory.
If you want to construe my “song-master” as a collection of individual “Machines”, each capable of making song-copies, that’s fine too. Yes, it is true that your use of Machine #97 does not interfere with my use of Machine #1, but that is irrelevant. Your use of Machine #97 interferes with MY use of Machine #97.
The intellectual dishonesty in your position is thus made plain. You arbitrarily construe “thing” differently when analyzing PP versus when you analyze IP.
My song is not like 1 machine, it’s like a whole bunch of machines, and I homesteaded them all. Every . . . last . . . one.
In the physical example, no machine can be both on and off simultaneously. Nor can the factory be in different states simultaneously. Intangible things, however, regardless of how you construe “thing,” can be in any number of states simultaneously. It’s only the physical things required to bring intangible things into existence that can’t be in multiple states simultaneously.
A song is not like a factory because a factory can’t be in different states simultaneously; a song can be. The things required to bring a song into existence can’t be in different states simultaneously, which is why property rights are necessary in those things.
A song can be brought into existence in various ways. Here are a few examples:
- A human body + standing room + a computer + electricity + cables + instruments + knowledge of music
- A human body + standing room + action of whistling melody + knowledge of a pattern of information
- A human body + standing room + acoustic guitar + action of playing guitar and whistling melody + knowledge of patterns of information
- A computer + electricity + cables + speakers + a digital file containing a pattern of information
Are property rights necessary in bodies, standing room, computers, electricity, cables, instruments, guitars, and speakers? Yes. A song can not be brought into existence without property rights in these things.
Are property rights necessary in actions, knowledge, and patterns of information? No. A song can be brought into existence in any number of ways without property rights in these things.
If you came up with an idea for a car and built one, then someone else saw your car and built their own, did you homestead their car?
“Productive capacity” is simply another way of saying “The existence of machines capable of mass-producing cheap copies.” Prior to the homesteading of the machines, there is no property right in the machines, because the machines do not exist.
Observing that a “mass-productive capacity” exists now, when it did not exist before, is proof that somebody homesteaded machines into existence.
As a thought experiment, suppose you were on a jury and asked to decide a dispute about ownership of a car. Albert possesses a car, which he claims he built with his own hands and own materials, from scratch. Brian owns a car factory, and Brian claims that Albert sneaked into the factory and made the car using the factory’s machines. There are no security photos or fingerprints. Albert’s car is an exact match of the other cars which are known to have been produced in Brian’s factory. Who do you believe?
The “song” cannot be in two different states simultaneously, exactly as with the factory. This is the entire point of “Songs are like Factories (a deeper look).” When you copy, you’re using Machine #97.
When you speak of the “impossibility” of bringing things into existence, I assume you mean “legally impossible”. It is physically possible to do all sorts of things, with no recognized property rights at all.
It is legally impossible to do anything without a property right in one’s own body. It is legally impossible to grow a crop of tomatoes absent a property right in the farmland.
However, suppose you had a property right in your body, and in your land, but not in the tomatoes grown upon your land. In that scenario, it is legally possible to grow tomatoes, just as it is legally possible to write a song without a property right in the resulting song.
As always, your effort to show some kind of functional distinction between PP and IP fails.
All that matters is whether Albert built the car with his own materials. Period.
A song is information. As such, it most undeniably can be in many states simultaneously, just like recipes, knowledge, formulas, etc. You refuse to acknowledge this and fall back on your analogies as though they are arguments. They are not.
The difference between PP and so-called “IP” is that property rights in physical things are necessary to avoid conflict: if two people want to use the same physical thing simultaneously for different purposes, they can’t. If two people want to use the same so-called “IP” simultaneously for different purposes, they can. It’s as simple as that. It really is.
Make an argument against this. Seriously. Make an argument without saying that songs are like factories and I’m using machine #97. If I’m making a cake with the same recipe as you, using my own tools and ingredients, am I using your property? Of course not.
No 2 legal cases are identical, ever. We understand the present case by applying abstracted principles from prior cases. This case is like that case, because . . .
Kinsella’s entire argument is just a convoluted diatribe based on the assumption the rivalry must be physical.
People can’t use the same physical thing simultaneously for different purposes without interfering. I have already explained in depth how this is the case in your machine example. The machine is only one machine. It can only be in one state at one time.
I have also already explained in depth how your concept of “interference” is bizarre and amounts to: “It is true that we both can do whatever we want with the thing simultaneously, but I don’t want someone else to do particular things with the thing. Therefore, because they are going against my wishes, they are interfering with me.”
Notice that it doesn’t matter at all how I define a “thing.” Any intangible “thing,” no matter how you define it, can be used by any number of people simultaneously.
Every time you attempt to show that IP behaves differently, it doesn’t.
You can’t magically create an alternate universe in which a song is a factory and claim that physical property doesn’t behave differently from “IP” in that world as though that’s an argument for planet Earth. It’s not.
I can whistle a song while someone else plays it on their guitar while someone else plays it with their band while someone else does a mash-up while someone else records their spin on it while someone else makes another song inspired by it while… and on and on and on.
No difference.
If X requires the contemporaneous use of a physical object in order to be useful, then X cannot be property.
Call it a “container’. Call it a “tool”. Call it “abracadabra”. I don’t care what you call it. What’s your rule?
None of the things you list can be done with the machines at the same time as the owner wishes something different to be done with the machines without coming into conflict.
In the case of the song everyone can do all of the things I list simultaneously, regardless of what any other person wishes, without coming into conflict.
In the case of the factory everyone can do all of the things I list simultaneously , regardless of what any other person wishes, without coming into conflict (because they are all using separate machines).
Same thing. Every time. Always will be.
Someday you might wonder why the Austro-libertarians use these kinds of rigorous analyses, except have failed to do so with IP. You’ve had your philosophical pocket picked by Kinsella.
You may not like this, but a song doesn’t physically exist. It can’t be controlled like a factory or a machine. A song requires physical things in order to manifest, and yes, property right are necessary in those physical things.
Tell me, what’s the difference between a song and a recipe?
Trumpets blare!!!! Hooray for Stephen Davis!!!!!!!!!
You’re right, I don’t like it. I LOVE IT!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (Dances around table like celebrating a touchdown)
Rigorous allegorical answer:
The book “How to Bake Great Cakes” contains several recipes (instructions, methods) for different types of cake (For chocolate cake – start with a bowl, add flour, sugar, eggs, etc). The book “How to Profit in the Cake Business” contains instructions about cake-factory design, cake marketing, etc.
Clyde purchases and reads one copy of each book. Acting on his new knowledge, Clyde builds a cake-factory. Now Clyde is able to mass-produce identical cake-copies for sale on the market.
The book “How to Write Great Songs” contains several recipes (instructions, methods) for different types of songs (For Hip Hop songs – start with a drum beat, add a bass line, chord progression, lyrical catch-phrase, etc). The book “How to Profit in the Song Business” contains instructions about song-mastering, song marketing, etc.
Clyde purchases and reads one copy of each book. Acting on his new knowledge, Clyde writes and records a song-master (which is a factory). Now Clyde is able to mass-produce identical song-copies for sale on the market.
A recipe a pattern of information. Using it, I pick up my tools and ingredients and use my body to perform actions that result in the production of my version of the recipe. The pattern is of no use to anyone if it is not manifested by physical things.
So no, the pattern itself is not the “good, already produced.” The pattern itself is certainly useful for guiding action, but if not manifested using physical things, it can’t be enjoyed.
Sure, you could look at playing a song or baking a cake as “distribution” if you want, and listening to a song or eating a cake as “consumption” if you want, but that in no way changes the fundamental reality of how songs and recipes are brought into existence. They are just patterns of information and they have no existence if they are not manifested by physical things.
http://homesteadip.blogspot.com/2013/01/the-alleged-case-against-intellectual.html
You are absolutely correct that a song requires the use of physical things (a “container”) in order to be useful. So what? Here’s your rule.
5. Intellectual property requires a physical container. Storing, transmitting and consuming IP can only be accomplished with tangible, physical things like paper, CDs, hard drives, modems, copper wire, DNA, and the human brain. Without physical property, IP disappears. IP is therefore meaningless, and the only correct system of rights is in physical, tangible things.
Rule 5. If X requires a physical container in order to be useful, then X cannot be property.
X=orange juice
Without a physical container, orange juice just spills on the ground, which is useless.
Therefore orange juice cannot be property?
Rule 5 fails.
As I mentioned earlier, and I know you don’t like this, it comes down to whether something is physical. But, this is not an assumption: it is arrived at after analyzing the nature of the human condition and why property rights are necessary. If two people want to use the exact same physical thing at the exact same time for different purposes, they can’t. If two people want to use the exact same intangible thing at the exact same time for different purposes, they can. So, in order to make conflict-free interaction possible, property rights in physical things are necessary, but property rights in intangible things are not.
(1) Is it physical?
No > property rights are not necessary
Yes > property rights may be necessary
(2) Are people actually conflicting over the use of the thing?
No > property rights are not necessary yet
Yes > property rights are necessary
I feel the need here to say again that “conflict” or “interference” doesn’t simply mean other people doing things that you disapprove of. Conflict or interference always, necessarily, comes down to conflict over physical things. It makes no sense to say that people are conflicting over a song, or over religion, because it is impossible to conflict over those things. People are really conflicting over the use of computers, speakers, and guitars, or the Gaza strip, say.
So, your entire theory actually comes down to who should control physical things, who should control computers and speakers and guitars and the like. You are talking about assigning partial property rights in physical things. Will you admit this?
“At the end of the day, your theory [of physical property] is a contrived way of saying that you should have control over the way other people use their bodies and physical things because you deserve to have control over the physical goods you ‘create’.” – Alexander Baker